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Abstract
This paper establishes that entry and exit regulate the top half of the profitability distribution
in the post-1970 U.S. economy. We, first, document stability in the distribution of total profits
earned on tangible, intangible, and financial capital. Whereas a narrower measure of returns
on tangible capital, instead, suggests rising dispersion, it fails to capture post-1970 growth in
intangible and financial assets. Second, we use quantile decompositions to show that churning
– specifically, exit for cause – regulates median and top-end profitability. Thus, the process by
which competition drives out unprofitable firms acts to stabilize profit rates in the U.S. economy.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we empirically analyze the extent to which ‘churning’, defined by firm entry and
exit into and out of the nonfinancial corporate sector, stabilizes the distribution of profit rates
across firms in the post-1970 U.S. economy. The behavior of the profit rate is an issue of central
importance in macroeconomics and political economy. Not only are profits a key driver of capital
accumulation, but profitability differentials across firms are also crucial to the dissemination of
innovations and the distribution of capital across sectors. Competition, in turn, plays a central
role in the across-firm regulation of profitability. On the one hand, competition for above-average
profits within industries, through the development of new products and cost-saving innovations,
generates dispersion in profit rates and, as such, acts as a disequalizing force. On the other hand,
differences in profitability across industries draw capital into industries where profitability is higher
at the expense of those where profitability is lower. These flows and the corresponding changes in
relative prices act as an equalizing force that limits dispersion. The classical paradigm emphasizes,
in particular, that a stable distribution of profit rates is a key feature of an economy’s long-run
equilibrium.1
Firm entry and exit serve as important mechanisms for the realization of both of these tenden-
cies. When new firms enter an industry with vintages of capital, technologies, or asset compositions
that differ from those of incumbent firms, they can disrupt the distribution of profit rates within
that industry and generate increased dispersion. At the same time, however, churning can also
contribute to profit rate equalization, as less profitable firms are pushed out. At the economy-
wide level, these counteracting effects of churning contribute to stabilizing the distribution of the
profit rate and regulating its central tendency, while simultaneously adding ‘turbulence’ around
this long-run equilibrium (Shaikh, 2016).
Through an analysis of U.S. firms from 1970 to 2017, we document evidence of long-term sta-
bility in the top half of the profit rate distribution across U.S. firms, and highlight the roles of
1The interplay of these two aspects of competition, which have led to a large literature in political economy, can
be traced to Marx’s writings on intra-industry competition in Capital Volume I (see, e.g., Marx, 1867, chs. 12 and
15) and inter-industry competition in Capital Volume III (see, e.g., Marx, 1894, ch. 10). For a recent discussion of
the role of competition in Marx’s analysis, see Moseley (2019). For recent overviews of Classical and Marxian theories
of competition, see Tsoulfidis (2015) and Shaikh (2016).
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both churning and changes in firms’ asset composition (growth in intangibles and financial assets)
in generating this stability. We begin by establishing that there is substantial long-term stabil-
ity in the profit rate distribution across U.S. firms since 1970. We emphasize a measure of total
profitability that describes returns earned on total assets. Specifically, we define total profitability
as total flows of both operating and non-operating income relative to the stock of tangible, finan-
cial, and intangible capital. Comparing its median and 90th percentiles shows that, even with a
modest decline in median total profitability through the 1980s, top firms are approximately twice
as profitable as the median firm over the full post-1970 period. This regularity is remarkable, not
only because it holds over an almost fifty-year time frame, but also because the post-1970 period
is otherwise characterized by considerable change in the nonfinancial corporate sector as reflected,
for example, in the ‘financialization’ of traditionally nonfinancial firms.
In contrast, we also show that there is a marked rise in dispersion when the profit rate is more
narrowly defined as operational returns on tangible capital. This rise in dispersion reflects both a
well-documented falling rate of operational profit through the 1980s (e.g. Michl, 1988; Shaikh, 1987;
Dumenil & Levy, 2002) and, even more strikingly, rapidly rising top-end profitability. To reconcile
these concurrent patterns of rising dispersion and stability, we compare the groups of top firms when
ranked by total versus operational profitability. We show that the overlap between these two groups
of top firms falls rapidly from the mid-1980s. At the same time, their asset compositions diverge:
relative to firms with top-end total profitability, top-end operational profit rates increasingly accrue
to firms with small shares of tangible capital in total assets and, conversely, large shares of financial
and intangible assets. In turn, even as firms at the top of the operational profitability distribution
record high (and rising) profits when earnings are evaluated relative to tangible capital, these same
firms (increasingly) underperform in returns on total assets. These patterns indicate that, rather
than capturing a meaningful rise in dispersion, rising top-end operational profitability reflects a
failure to capture post-1970 shifts in firms’ asset compositions and sources of funds.
We then analyze how competitive dynamics captured by entry and exit produce this stability
in the total profit rate distribution. To do so, we use quantile decompositions that distinguish the
contributions of continuing, entering, and exiting firms to the evolution of profitability at different
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quantiles of its distribution. Our empirical method, which closely follows that in Davis, de Souza
& Hernandez (2021), consists of two steps. First, we use a re-weighting method that draws on
DiNardo, Fortin & Lemieux (1996) to disaggregate the contributions made by entering, exiting,
and continuing firms to annual changes in the median and 90th percentiles of the profit rate.
Second, we consider firms’ reasons for exit. A simple measure of total exit obfuscates that, for
instance, bankruptcies may have an equalizing effect on profitability by pushing unprofitable firms
out of the sector, whereas (as we show below) firms exiting in mergers tend to have similar profit
rates to continuing firms. We, therefore, distinguish the impact of three reasons for exit—those that
are ‘for cause’ (i.e. bankruptcies), via mergers, and voluntary—on the evolution of profitability.
Because the method in our first step generates path dependencies in more detailed decompositions,
we use unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo, Fortin & Lemieux, 2009; Fortin, Lemieux & Firpo,
2011) to distinguish these reasons for exit.
Our decomposition results highlight that churning – and, most notably, exit for cause – plays a
key role in maintaining stability at both the median and the 90th percentile of the total profitabil-
ity distribution, by systematically offsetting declining profitability within continuing firms. Firms
exiting for cause are less profitable than incumbent firms, such that profitability measured across
the remaining firms rises when they leave the corporate sector. Over time, this effect of exit sys-
tematically offsets both declining profitability within continuing firms, and a negative contribution
made by entering firms to median profitability. This role of exit for cause highlights a powerful
mechanism wherein the process by which inter-firm competition drives out unprofitable firms lends
stability to the across-firm distribution of profit rates in the post-1970 U.S. economy.
Our results build on three strands of the existing literature. First, they speak to the large em-
pirical literature on profitability in the U.S. context that uses aggregate data to analyze profitability
over both short- and long-term time frames (for example, Dumenil & Levy, 2002; Bakir & Campbell,
2006; Basu & Vasudevan, 2012; Basu & Manolakos, 2013), and sectoral data to analyze tendencies
towards profit rate equalization (Tsoulfidis & Tsaliki, 2005). In turn, by analyzing profitability at
the firm level, we are able to draw on more detailed data that allows us to identify individual cases
of entry and exit, and to analyze distributional statistics away from the mean. Firm-level data,
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also, includes granular measures of net income and assets with which we can construct profitability
measures that consider tangible, intangible, and financial capital. The ability to build a broad
measure of capital addresses a common limitation of aggregate data that often requires restricting
analysis to the tangible capital stock (see Basu & Vasudevan, 2012). Notably, firm-level studies
motivated by classical theories of competition remain relatively few. An exception is Scharfenaker
& Semieniuk (2017), who find that profit rates converge to a stationary distribution, suggesting
that – even while preventing equalization – competition lends regularity to their distribution over
time.
Second, our results relate to two strands of the literature on firm-level profitability in main-
stream finance. This literature establishes evidence of both equalizing and disequalizing effects of
competition on the profitability distribution. Consistent with the notion that competition limits
dispersion, for example, Fama & French (2000) find that the earnings-to-assets ratio converges to
a common mean, conditional on proxies for fundamental differences in earnings potential (see also
Beaver, 1970; Nissim & Penman, 2001; Fairfield, Ramnath & Yohn, 2009). On the other hand,
Hirshleifer, Hsu & Li (2018) highlight the disruptive potential of technological innovations as tools
for gaining competitive advantage. Finally, studies exploring if limits to inter-industry competition
such as market concentration or barriers to entry generate persistent profitability differentials have
yielded mixed results (Goddard, Tavakoli & Wilson, 2005; Maury, 2018; Davis & Orhangazi, 2021;
De Loecker, Eeckhout & Unger, 2020).
A series of papers in the finance literature, also, examine the profitability of firms entering
and exiting the corporate sector. Fama & French (2004) find that, during the 1990s, which was a
period of fast entry, the profitability distribution among entering firms became more left-skewed and
survival rates declined, suggesting that a less profitable and riskier segment of the U.S. economy
accessed equity finance (see also Brown & Kapadia, 2007). In turn, Pástor, Taylor & Veronesi
(2009) find that profitability tends to fall in the years following a firm’s initial public offering, while
Doidge, Karolyi & Stulz (2017) show that firms become increasingly likely to delist for cause, rather
than through mergers, after the mid-1990s.
Third, the divergence we document between top firms’ total and operational profitability speaks
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to the literatures on financialization and intangibles, which emphasize a weakening link between
(operational) profitability and tangible investment (Stockhammer, 2005; Van Treeck, 2008; Davis,
2017) as firm portfolios have shifted towards financial and intangible assets (Davis, 2016; Orhangazi,
2019). One explanation for this investment-profit puzzle suggests that financial and intangible assets
have enabled firms to capture rising profits without making corresponding investments in tangible
capital (Orhangazi, 2019). In turn, our finding that firms with high and rapidly rising operational
profitability hold large stocks of intangible and financial assets, but underperform in total profits
suggests additional avenues for exploration. For example, intangibles may reflect growth strategies
wherein highly profitable firms in operational terms expand into new activities via mergers and, in
turn, mergers create balance sheet intangibles that depress overall profitability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our data and measures of
the profit rate, and in Section 3 we describe the evolution of the post-1970 profitability distribution.
In Section 4 we introduce the decomposition method that we use to analyze if churning stabilizes
the total profitability distribution, and we present results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 The profit rate
We begin by using the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) database, which describes all publicly-
listed nonfinancial corporations in the United States, to construct firm-level measures of the profit
rate from 1971 to 2017. We emphasize total profits earned on a broad measure of capital that
includes productive capital, commodity capital (e.g. inventories of finished goods), and financial
capital (money and financial assets) (see Basu & Vasudevan, 2012, p. 64). At the firm level, this
broad definition of capital is captured by total assets (at), which include fixed capital, financial
capital, and intangible capital.
Intangible capital, in particular, includes assets such as brandnames, trademarks, patents or
copyrights, as well as goodwill. Compustat estimates of intangibles fall, more specifically, into two
categories: ‘identifiable’ intangibles, which include items such as customer lists and technology-
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based intangibles like patents, and estimates of goodwill (which include all other intangibles not
otherwise classifiable as identifiable). Notably, both categories are primarily generated through the
the acquisition of other firms, rather than internal accumulation (Crouzet & Eberly, 2019). As
such, the evolution of balance sheet intangibles is closely linked to mergers and acquisitions.2 In
turn, financial assets include cash and other short-term investments, investments and advances,
receivables, and other miscellaneous assets.3 As we discuss below, firms’ growing stocks of financial
and intangible capital in recent decades makes the ability to capture these two asset categories key
for describing the evolution of overall profitability in this period. In fact, an important advantage
of firm-level accounting data lies in that the asset categories needed to analyze a broad measure of
capital are available over an extended time frame.
We measure profit flows as the sum of operating income before depreciation (oibdp) and non-
operating income (nopi). Operating income records a firm’s total sales after the cost of goods
sold (such as labor costs), and after general and administrative expense. Non-operating income
accounts for income derived from all other activities, including, for example, interest income, divi-
dend income, and gains (or losses) on sales of marketable securities (Compustat, 2000). Both are
net income concepts that, together, account for a firm’s total earnings, whether on fixed, intangi-
ble, or financial assets. To more directly capture the net flow of funds available to the firm, we
also deduct both income taxes (txt) and interest expense (xint) from total profits.4 Notably, while
nonoperating income includes interest income, neither operating nor nonoperating income is net of
interest expense. Finally, we normalize by total assets, thereby yielding a measure of profit flows
relative to all capital advanced in the production process, independently of how that capital is
financed (i.e. by equity, debt, or retained earnings).5
2See Lev (2000) for a discussion of measurement error in intangibles accounting, including in how firms capitalize
intangible assets and due to mis-valuation of goodwill. Also note that, while Compustat’s fixed capital measures are
at historical rather than replacement cost, Basu (2013) suggests that the choice of capital stock valuation is largely
irrelevant for much of our time frame (through 2010).
3Cash and short-term investments are CCM item che; investments and advances are CCM items ivaeq and ivao;
and other assets include both other current assets aco and other assets ao (see Davis, 2016).
4Dumenil & Levy (2002), for example, argue that deducting taxes on profits from total income is necessary to
accurately measure total profits accruing to firms.
5Thus, we do not deduct liabilities from total assets. Given an increase in external borrowing and rising equity
repurchases over the post-1970 period, however, the intersection between profitability and borrowing also raises inter-
esting questions for future analysis. For examples of work that also normalize by total (gross) assets see Scharfenaker
& Semieniuk (2017) in the classical literature and Kahle & Stulz (2017) in the mainstream finance literature.
6
There is, of course, substantial variation in the political economy literature surrounding mea-
surement of the profit rate. In particular, many researchers utilize a profit rate in which the stock
of capital is defined by fixed assets (see, for example, the discussion and analysis in Basu, 2013).
In contrast, we emphasize the total profit rate as our primary measure so as to capture firms’
total profit flows relative to the overall stock of capital used to generate these profits. In doing
so, we are also able to account for changing composition of capital over post-1970 period, wherein
tangible capital has become a declining share of firms’ overall assets. However, we also compare
the total profit rate to a narrower measure, which we call operational profitability, that is defined
by a firm’s income from operations relative to the stock of tangible capital used to generate that
income. To define this measure, we again define operational profit flows as operational income after
depreciation, less income taxes, and less interest expense. We normalize these income flows by tan-
gible assets, defined as the sum of fixed capital (property, plant and equipment net of depreciation,
ppent) and inventories (invt).6
2.2 Identifying entry and exit
Our final CCM sample includes all observations describing nonfinancial firms incorporated in the
United States with reported profitability data, and non-negative sales and total assets.7 We use fic
to identify country of incorporation, and SIC codes (6000-6799) to identify and exclude financial
firms. To avoid conflating industry switches with cases of entry and exit, we also drop firms whose
industrial classification switches into or out of finance (41 firms). Finally, we trim each profitability
measure at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
The second main part of our data identifies instances of firm entry and exit, and exiting firms’
reasons for exit. Information describing firms’ fiscal year of exit and reason for exiting the nonfi-
nancial corporate sector (delisting codes) is available in the Center for Research in Security Prices
6The trends in operational profitability we show below are insensitive to various measurement choices, such as
excluding inventories from the fixed capital stock; including taxes and interest expense in operating income; and
measuring operating income as ‘income before extraordinary items’ (ib). Like operating income before depreciation,
income before extraordinary items measures a firm’s income after expenses, income taxes, and interest. However,
this measure also nets out depreciation, which reduces the level of profits but does not change the time trends. We
choose not to emphasize ib because changes in depreciation allowances – when used, for example, as a policy tool to
encourage investment in certain industries – may suggest artificial changes in profitability.
7We also limit the sample to primary issues (linkprim equal to P or C), covering over 99% of observations.
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(CRSP) dataset. Following the classification of delisting codes in Fama & French (2004), we dis-
tinguish three reasons for exit. First, firms may exit ‘for cause’ (dlstcd greater than 400, excluding
570 and 573). Exit for cause implies a firm is (involuntarily) delisted by an exchange because it
no longer meets listing requirements, because it has been unprofitable for several years, its market
capitalization is too small, or its stock price is too low (Doidge et al., 2017; Martinez & Serve,
2017). Exits for cause are conceptually akin to bankruptcy or liquidation. Second, a firm may
delist because it is acquired in a merger (dlstcd between 200 and 399). Third, firms may voluntar-
ily delist (dlstcd equal to 500 or 573), for example in going-private transactions. Because CRSP
is reported at the security level, a firm can have multiple securities that delist at different times.
To describe a firm’s reason for exit, we therefore use CRSP to identify the fiscal year and delisting
code for a firm’s final security to delist.8 We merge this delisting information with CCM on fiscal
year and firm (permco), thereby matching the reason for exit (among firms that do exit) to the
corresponding observation for profitability.
Finally, we use the CCM-CRSP merged sample to identify instances of entry and exit. We,
first, classify a firm as entering in the fiscal year it joins the sample and as exiting in the fiscal year
it disappears with a delist code, conditional on that it also reports profitability data in those years.
Thus, a firm that first appears in CCM and also reports profits in 1982 enters in 1982, whereas
a firm that reports both a delisting code and profitability in 1982 exits in 1982. Second, we also
allow for cases in which profitability reporting lags a firm’s entry by one year or leads a firm’s exit
by one year. For instance, a firm may appear in CCM in fiscal year t, but not report profitability
until fiscal year t + 1, or it may cease reporting profit data the fiscal year prior to delisting. In
these cases, we consider the first (last) year the firm reports profitability to be the year of entry
(exit). This single year of lags and leads accounts for timing discrepancies between a firm’s month
of entry (or exit) and the first (or last) full fiscal year for which it reports balance sheet and income
8For example, if a firm has two securities, one of which delists in June 2000 due to a merger, and one of which
delists for cause in September 2002, we classify this firm as exiting for cause in September 2002. There are 383 firms
with multiple securities that delist at different times. An additional eleven firms have multiple securities delist in
the same month and year, but for different reasons. Because we cannot distinguish the firm’s reason for exit in these
cases, we drop these eleven firms.
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Figure 1: Trends in selected quantiles of total and operational profitability, 1950-2017
(a) 90-50 ratio (b) Median (c) 90th Percentile
Notes: The figure shows trends in the 90th and 50th percentiles of total and operational profitability between 1950 and
2017. Total profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments,
relative to total assets. Operational profitability is operating income before depreciation minus taxes and interest
payments, relative to fixed capital and inventories. Both profit rates are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile
separately for the 1950-1969 and 1970-2017 periods, and are expressed in percentages. See Section 2 for details
describing the data and sample.
data.9 However, we exclude any firm for which the length of this lag or lead exceeds one year.10
Finally, we exclude firms with gaps in reported profitability, to ensure that firms cannot contribute
to the decompositions as entering firms in multiple years.11 The final sample describes 16,056 firms
(174,731 observations) between 1971 and 2017.
3 Regularity in the profitability distribution
In Figure 1 we plot the median and 90th percentile of the total and operational profitability dis-
tributions, as well as the ratio between them (the 90-50 ratio), over time. We show each series
between 1950 and 2017; however, because delisting information is only available after 1970, our
9For instance, a firm enters in April and reports fiscal year-end information in May is unlikely to report income
and balance sheet information in the fiscal year it first appears in CCM, given that it is only in operation for one
month prior to its first fiscal year’s end. By allowing a one year lag/lead, we avoid dropping firms like these from our
analysis.
10Thus, a firm enters in year t under two conditions: (1) it appears in CCM for the first time in t and also reports
profit data in t (97.7% of entering firms), or (2) it appears in CCM in t−1 but first reports profitability in t. Similarly,
a firm exits in year t if: (1) it leaves CCM with a delisting code from CRSP in t and also reports profitability in t
(96.8% of exiting firms), or (2) it reports a delisting code in year t + 1, but only reports profitability through t. Our
decomposition results are robust to both a more restrictive assignment of entry and exit, which excludes firms where
entry or exit is not contemporaneous with reported profitability, and to a more expansive assignment, in which we
allow for two lags or leads of missing profit rate information. Finally, a small share of firms (0.13% of observations)
leave the sample before it ends in 2017 without a delisting code. We exclude these firms to ensure that we link all
exits to a delisting code.
11We exclude firms with gaps for each profit measure independently.
9
discussion emphasizes the post-1970 period.
To begin, consider the solid lines in each figure, which describe total profitability. Figure 1a,
which plots plots the 90-50 ratio, highlights that the total profit rate of highly-profitable firms
relative to those at the median is largely stable since 1950, wherein firms at the 90th percentile are
approximately twice as profitable as the median firm. More specifically, the 90-50 ratio rises from
an average of 1.77 during the 1970s to 2.05 during the 1980s, before settling at 2.22 since 1980.
Thus, notwithstanding a modest rise during the 1980s, Figure 1a captures substantial long-term
regularity in the profitability of top firms relative to those at the median in post-1970 U.S. economy.
In turn, the solid lines in Figures 1b and c plot the median and 90th percentiles of total
profitability independently. Figure 1b shows that a fall in the median, from an average of 9.6%
between 1950 and 1979 to 7.3% by 1989, drives the rise in the 90-50 ratio through the 1980s.
This decline in median profitability is consistent with previous evidence of a falling rate of profit
in the U.S. through the early 1980s (Shaikh, 1987; Michl, 1988; Dumenil & Levy, 2002).12 Since
1990, however, the median total profit rate is largely steady. Concurrently, profitability at the 90th
percentile hovers close to its average of 16.2% over the full period (averaging 15.8% in the 1970s,
16.0% in the 1980s, 16.8% in the 1990s, and 16.3% since 2000). Thuse, even while profitability has
not equalized around a uniform rate, these patterns suggest remarkable regularity in its distribution
over time (see also Scharfenaker & Semieniuk, 2017).13
3.1 Reconciling the total and operational profitability distributions
At the same time, however, Figure 1 also captures a marked increase in the dispersion of operating
profit rates across firms. In fact, the 90-50 ratio for operational profitability more than doubles
12In fact, these studies emphasize operational, rather than total, profitability. As discussed in Section 3.1 below,
median operational profitability also falls (and more dramatically) over this time frame.
13These conclusions are corroborated by disaggregating growth in the 90-50 ratio between two years into the sum of
three terms: the rate of change in the 90th percentile, the rate of change in the inverse of the median, and the cross-
product of the first two terms. Letting p90,t and p50,t denote the 90th percentile and the median at time t; rt =
p90,t
p50,t
denote the 90-50 ratio; and carets denote rates of change between years t − 1 and t, then algebraic manipulation
yields: r̂t = p̂90,t + p̂
−1
50,t + p̂90,t × p̂
−1
50,t. The top panel of Table A1, which focuses on total profitability, shows that
in the 1970s and again since 1990, year-to-year changes in the 90th and 50th percentiles approximately offset one
another, such that firms at the top remain approximately twice as profitable as those at the median. During the
1980s, the 90-50 ratio grows an average of 2.44 percent per year due to an annual average fall in median profitability
of 2.94 percentage points that is only slightly offset by an average annual decline in the 90th percentile.
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between 1970 and 2017, as profits at the 90th percentile rise from 2.1 times median profits in the
1970s to almost five times median profits by 2017. This increase is, in particular, concentrated
during the 1980s and 1990s, when the 90-50 ratio rises from 2.2 in 1979 to reach 4.8 by 1999.14
In turn, Figures 1b and c show that, while both rising top-end and falling median operational
profitability contribute to rising dispersion during the 1980s, the continued post-1990 increase
reflects rapidly rising top-end profitability. Most strikingly, operational profitability at the 90th
percentile rises nearly monotonically from the early 1980s, with the fastest expansions occurring
during the 1980s and 1990s, as top-end profitability rises from an average of 32% during the 1980s
to 75% from 2000-2009. During the 1980s, falling median profitability, which declines from an
average of 13.2% in the 1970s by 10.7% in 1989, also drives up dispersion. Save for the Dotcom
crisis, however, median operational profitability recovers from the early 1990s, reaching an average
of 18.5% since 2010. As such, the post-1990 rise in dispersion is due to rising top-end profit rates.15
The differences in the evolution of total and operational profitability raise a key question: Does
rising top-end operational profitability capture a meaningful increase in dispersion, or does the
stability in the total profitability distribution better describe this period? If the same firms sit
at the top of both distributions, then rising top-end operational profit rates would suggest that
financial and intangible capital — even while depressing total relative to operational profitability by
increasing the denominator against which profits are measured — allow top firms to achieve rapidly
rising returns on operational activities. This conclusion would suggest that intangible assets like
brand names have enabled firms to capture profits without increasing fixed investment (Orhangazi,
2019), and indicate that the dominant pattern is one of rising dispersion.
We show, however, that this is not the case: Not only is it decreasingly likely that a firm
14We show cumulative distribution functions in the appendix, which show these observations regarding both total
and operational profitability apply to the top half of both distributions more broadly. Figure A1a shows that
dispersion in total profitability is stable across the top half of the distribution, although it increases in the bottom
half. Figure A1b shows that the operational profitability distribution rotates clockwise around the 40th percentile,
with operational profitability rising at each quantile above the median (with the largest increases at the very top)
and declining below the median.
15Table A1 reiterates this conclusion. During the 1980s, growth in the 90-50 ratio averages 5.0% per year, with the
90th and 50th percentiles contributing nearly equally to this growth (2.44 and 2.82 percentage points, respectively).
During the 1990s and first decade of the 2000s, the 90th percentile pushes up the 90-50 ratio by annual averages of
5.21 and 4.70 percentage points – even as rising median profitability partially offsets the impact of rising top-end
profit rates on dispersion (by annual averages of 1.72 in 1990-1999 and 2.21 percentage points in 2000-2009).
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Figure 2: Percent overlap between top 20% of firms by total and operational profitability
Notes: This figure shows the share of firms in the top 20% when ranked by operational profitability that are also in
the top 20% when ranked by total profitability. This share is shown in percent per year. Total profitability is the sum
of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments, relative to total assets. Operational
profitability is operating income minus taxes and interest payments, relative to fixed capital and inventories. See
Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.
with top-end operational profitability also lies at the top of the total profitability distribution since
the mid-1980s, but firms with the highest operational profit rates also rely proportionally less on
tangible capital than those with the highest total profit rates. Thus, for a growing share of firms
with rising operational profitability, high operational profit rates are an artifact of growing stocks
of financial and intangible assets that depress profitability by inflating a firm’s total assets (i.e. the
denominator of the profit rate) without generating a commensurate increase in net income (i.e. the
numerator).
In Figure 2, we plot the share of firms in the top quintile of operational profitability that also
lie in the top quintile of the total profitability distribution. These calculations show that, while
almost 70% of firms in the top quintile of operating profitability are also in the top quintile of
total profitability during the 1970s, this overlap falls rapidly from the mid-1980s to only 39.6%
since 2000. This decline coincides with both the years when top-end operational profitability rises
rapidly and also with years of rapid entry into the nonfinancial sector (Kahle & Stulz, 2017),
suggesting that new entrants have been relatively more likely to record high operational than high
total profitability, thereby driving up top-end operational profitability during the 1990s and early
2000s.
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As the overlap between these groups of top firms declines, their characteristics also diverge. Of
particular note here is a post-1980 expansion in intangible and financial capital, which is markedly
more pronounced among top firms when ranked by operational profitability. Much of this rise
reflects intangibles. As in the full sector (Orhangazi, 2019), the intangible asset holdings of highly
profitable firms first rise during the 1990s and accelerate thereafter. Among firms in the top quintile
of operational profitability, intangibles account for 4.7% of total assets in the 1970s; 10.6% in the
1990s; and more than a third (34.9%) of assets since 2010.16 In contrast, among top firms by total
profitability, the rates of increase are similar but the levels are substantively lower, with intangibles
rising from 2.5% of assets in the 1970s to reach 18.1% after 2010.
Thus, while intangibles are increasingly important for both sets of top firms, their weight is
greater (and increasingly so) for firms with top operational profit rates. Similar patterns charac-
terize the evolution of financial assets, albeit with an earlier peak. On average, 47.2% of the assets
of top firms by operational profitability are financial during the 1970s. This share rises during the
1970s and 1980s to an average of 62.2% during the 1990s, before settling at an average of 50.5%
since 2000. Among top firms by total profitability, these shares are again lower, averaging 37.9%
in the 1970s, 48.2% in the 1990s, and 41.4% since 2010.
As such, firms at the top of the operational profitability distribution rely proportionally less
on tangible capital and more on financial and intangible assets to generate income than those
with top-end total profitability, and this distinction grows in recent decades.17 However, the fact
that these firms are decreasingly likely to also have high total profitability indicates that they fail
to earn commensurate overall returns once accounting for their relatively large stocks of financial
and intangible assets. In fact, the post-2010 share of net nonoperating income in total profits for
16These calculations refer to mean shares, and are also summarized in appendix Table A2. To avoid introducing
missing observations that change our sample of firms, we impute zeros for any subcomponent of financial assets or
for intangibles observations that are missing in a given year, although the conclusions are not sensitive to instead
dropping these missing observations. The qualitative patterns in Table A2 also hold for median shares.
17While rising top-end operational profit rates could also reflect small firm size, these firms are not dispropor-
tionately small by total assets in recent decades. If there were no systematic relation between high operational
profitability and firm size we would expect roughly 10% of the most profitable firms to also lie in the top decile of the
firm-size distribution (i.e. to also be large firms). Since 1970, the share of firms in the top deciles of both operating
profitability and total assets approaches and reaches this 10% benchmark (equal to 3.7% in 1970-1979, 8.2% in 2000-
2010, and 10.9% since 2010). In turn, while a disproportionate number of firms with high operational profitability
are small when only considering tangible capital, this distinction only reiterates that intangible and financial assets
are a growing share of total assets for firms with top operational profit rates.
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firms in the top quintile of operational profitability falls from an average of 9.5% in the 1980s to
become negative since 2010 (-2.4%). In contrast, this post-2010 share of nonoperating income in
total profits for firms in the top quintile of total profitability averages 3.4%. Together, these trends
indicate that — rather than helping top firms pull away from the rest of the sector — financial
and intangible assets stabilize the distribution over this period, such that the most salient pattern
is one of substantial regularity in profitability distribution after 1970.
Why might firms with high operational profitability acquire financial and intangible assets, when
these assets depress their overall profit rates? Intangible assets may, for example, complement op-
erational activities, allowing firms that make heavy use of intangibles to capture high operational
returns — even as these intangibles inflate the denominator of the profit rate and reduce total prof-
itability (Orhangazi, 2019). Large stocks of intangibles may, alternatively, reflect growth strategies,
wherein firms with high operating profitability expand into new activities or product markets by ac-
quiring other firms, rather than through internal accumulation. Such acquisitions generate balance
sheet intangibles, which depress the total profit rate. Finally, the fact that financial asset holdings
include large stocks of cash (Bates, Kahle & Stulz, 2009; Davis, 2016) suggests that growth in
financial assets may simply reflect a lack of opportunities to invest these funds in tangible capital.
While a full delineation between these hypotheses lies outside the scope of this paper, considering
these mechanisms is an important focus for future research.
4 Quantile decomposition method
Does churning play a central role in producing this regularity in the distribution of profit rates
across the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector? We, next, turn to distinguishing the contributions
that entering, exiting, and continuing firms make to the evolution of profitability using quantile
decompositions, which allow us to analyze distributional statistics away from the mean (where,
following Section 3, we emphasize the median and the ninetieth percentile). The discussion of the
quantile decomposition method in this section draws heavily on the exposition in Davis et al. (2021),
which analyzes the relative importance of churning versus within-firm behavior for the evolution of
firm balance sheet structure after 1980, but does not distinguish between firms’ reasons for exit.
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The method consists of two steps. We, first, draw on the re-weighting method in DiNardo
et al. (1996) to disentangle the impact of changes within continuing firms from the impact of
churning (i.e. entering and exiting firms) on the median and 90th percentile of the profitability
distribution. Second, we use unconditional quantile regressions (Firpo et al., 2009; Fortin et al.,
2011) to disaggregate the total effect of exit into the contributions made by exits for cause, mergers,
and voluntary delists. In each case, we conduct rolling decompositions between adjacent years. This
choice is important: as the interval over which we perform the decomposition lengthens, the fact
that are fewer continuing firms and more entering/exiting firms makes the interpretation of the
results increasingly arbitrary.18
4.1 Step 1: Continuing, entering and exiting firms
The first step of our decomposition method follows the re-weighting approach in DiNardo et al.
(1996) and the application of this method to firm data in Davis et al. (2021) to decompose the change
at a quantile (k) of the profit rate distribution into the contributions of continuing, entering and
exiting firms. We illustrate this decomposition in Figure 3, where F is the cumulative distribution
function of a variable Y at times t and t + 1. Each function is defined as FY,t(q) = Prob[Y ≤ q],
such that quantile k at time t is qk,t = F
−1
Y,t (k).
We begin by disaggregating the change in the profit rate at quantile k between two years
into the contribution of changes within continuing firms and a total contribution from churning.
To do so, we construct a counterfactual distribution for t + 1 (F̃Y,t) that holds the composition
of firms between t and t + 1 constant. This counterfactual includes the observations of Y for
continuing firms in t + 1 and for exiting firms in t, and excludes all new firms entering in t + 1.
Using this counterfactual distribution, we can decompose the change in quantile k between t and
t + 1 (qk,t+1 − qk,t) into two components. The first component (q̃k,t+1 − qk,t) is the within-firm
effect, which measures the contribution of changes within the set of continuing firms to changes
in the distribution of Y between t and t + 1, while holding the composition of firms in period t
18If, for example, we were to use a decade-long interval (e.g. 1990-1999), then a firm that enters in 1991 and stays
in the sample until 1999, such that it is in the sample for all years but one, would be classified as entering—even
though it is a continuing firm for the majority of the decade (Davis et al., 2021).
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Notes: This figure is drawn from Davis et al. (2021).
constant. The second component (qk,t+1 − q̃k,t+1) is the composition effect, which measures the
total contribution of changes made by entering and exiting firms. To isolate this compositional
component, we hold the distribution of continuing firms (observed in t + 1) constant, and replace
the distribution of Y across exiting firms with its distribution across entering firms. Thus, this
decomposition uses exiting firms as the reference group against which to assess the contribution
made by continuing firms to the change in Y over time.19
We, similarly, decompose the compositional effect into the independent contributions of entering
and exiting firms, by building a second counterfactual sample of only continuing firms in t + 1
(q̃Ck,t+1):
qk,t+1 − q̃k,t+1 = (qk,t+1 − q̃Ck,t+1) + (q̃Ck,t+1 − q̃k,t+1) (1)
where the first term in parentheses measures the contribution of entering firms and the second
term measures the contribution of exiting firms, with each effect evaluated relative to the reference
group of continuing firms. For example, a positive value for the first term – which gives the change
in the profit rate at quantile k for t + 1, when new firms enter and after exiting firms have left –
implies that (relative to firms that continue in t+ 1) entering firms raise profitability at quantile k.
19We can, instead, use entering firms as the reference group by computing a counterfactual distribution for period
t (rather than t + 1) that replaces the observations for exiting firms with those of entering firms. Our results are
robust to changing the reference group (see appendix Table A3).
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Similarly, the second term defines the change in the profit rate at quantile k and time t+ 1, when
exiting firms leave the sample, before they are replaced by entering firms. A positive value indicates
that (relative to the firms that continue in t+ 1) exiting firms would have lowered profitability at
quantile k if they had stayed in the sample with the same profit rate as in period t. By exiting,
these firms raise the profit rate at quantile k.
4.2 Step 2: Distinguishing between reasons for exit
The re-weighting method in Section 4.1 cannot be used to distinguish between the effects of different
reasons for exit. This limitation occurs because accounting for different reasons for exit generates a
path-dependent decomposition, wherein the results are sensitive to the order in which we compute
the effect of each group of exiting firms.20 We, therefore, use unconditional quantile regressions
(Firpo et al., 2009) to estimate the individual effects of reasons for exit on quantile k, relative to a
counterfactual of continuing firms in t+ 1. In doing so, we decompose the total effect of exit into
three terms – describing exit for cause, due to mergers, and voluntary exits – each of which has the
same interpretation as the terms in the first step of the decomposition above.
Specifically, we estimate the following unconditional quantile regression:






t+1 + εt+1 (2)
where RIF (Ỹ , k)t+1 is the recentered influence function of Ỹ at quantile k of the distribution of Ỹ





variables capturing whether exiting firms delist for cause (EC), in a merger (EM ), or voluntarily
(EV ). The expectation of RIF (Ỹ , k)t+1 is the unconditional quantile k of Ỹ . Estimating Equation
(2) using OLS, therefore, gives the effect of changes in the composition of each group on q̃k,t+1.
21
By estimating Equation (2), we obtain fitted values for the coefficients which, when evaluated at
20In particular, the fact that the effect of each reason for exit would be assessed against a different counterfactual
sample depending on the order in which the effect is computed compromises comparability (see Fortin et al., 2011;
Davis et al., 2021).
21The influence function at quantile k of a random variable yields the effect of an individual observation on that
quantile, and the recentered influence function is a transformation of the influence function such that its expected
value is equal to the quantile k (see Firpo et al., 2009).
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the sample means of the covariates, yield the observed value of quantile k in the counterfactual
sample:








where bars denote sample means (i.e. the observed shares of exiting firms by reason for exit).
Finally, we obtain the complete decomposition by combining Equations (1) and (3):
q̃Ck,t+1 − q̃k,t+1 = −β̂ĒCt+1 − γ̂ĒMt+1 − λ̂ĒVt+1 − e (4)
where Equation (4) decomposes the contribution of exiting firms into the individual effects of exit
for cause, due to mergers, and due to voluntary delisting. Each effect is the product of two terms:
the estimated partial effect of increasing the number of firms exiting for cause (β̂), due to mergers
(γ̂), or voluntarily (λ̂), and the observed shares of firms exiting for each reason (ĒCt+1, Ē
M
t+1, and
ĒVt+1). Note that, because each term describes firms that are leaving the sample, these contributions
enter with the opposite sign of the regression output. Finally, the residual (e = q̃Ck,t+1 − α̂) reflects
that RIF (Y, k), which is computed over the full distribution of Y , has an expectation conditional
on specific covariate values that generally differs from the value of Y at k, conditional on these
same values.22 In our analysis, the magnitude of these residuals is generally small and moves in the
same direction as the estimated effects, such that they do not affect interpretation of our results.
5 Results
We use this quantile decomposition method to disentangle the contribution of continuing firms
from that of churning created by entry and exit to the evolution of the 50th and 90th percentiles of
profitability in the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector. Following the descriptive discussion, we focus
on explaining the stability of the median and the 90th percentile of total profitability; however,
we also comment on the main differences in operational profitability at the end of the section.
These decompositions highlight that the regularity of both the median and the 90th percentile of
total profitability shown in Section 3 is produced by churning: At both quantiles, churning – and,
22For further discussion, see Davis et al. (2021).
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in particular, exit for cause – has regulated profitability by compensating for falling profitability
within continuing firms and, at the median, for the negative impact of new entry on profitability.
In each set of results in this section we show the results averaged by decades and, following the
presentation in Section 4.1, use exiting firms as the reference group. In the appendix, we also show
results that use entering firms as the reference group (Tables A3), which reiterate our main findings
about the role of churning in maintaining stability at both the median and the 90th percentile of
the profitability distribution.
5.1 Median profitability
In Table 1, we show results decomposing continuing, entering, and exiting firms’ contributions to
the evolution of median total profitability between 1971 and 2017. The first column reports the
average annual percentage point change in the median profit rate by decade, and the next two
columns use Step 1 of our decomposition method to distinguish the contribution of continuing
firms (the within-firm effect) from that of churning (the composition effect).23 We, also, use Step
1 to distinguish the contributions of entering and exiting firms. In turn, the final four columns use
Step 2 of our decomposition method to disaggregate the total effect of exit into the independent
contributions of exits that are for cause, due to mergers, and voluntary.
Table 1: Decomposing average annual changes in median total profitability
Median
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.00
1980-1989 -0.26 -0.24 -0.02 -0.13 0.11 0.19 -0.06 0.01 -0.02
1990-1999 -0.07 -0.17 0.10 -0.14 0.24 0.28 -0.02 0.00 -0.03
2000-2009 0.02 -0.13 0.15 -0.12 0.27 0.30 -0.00 0.02 -0.05
2010-2017 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.00
Notes: The first column measures the average annual change in the median of total profitability. Total profitability
is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments, relative to total assets.
The reference group for the counterfactual sample is outgoing firms. See Section 2 for details describing the data
and sample.
These decompositions of the median produce two key results. First, both within-firm trends
23When comparing these average annual changes to the trends in Section 3 note that we compute this change for
each pair of adjacent years. As such, it generally differs from the total change between the first and last year divided
by the number of years in the period.
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and the entry of new firms push down the median profit rate since 1980. Second, and by contrast,
exit for cause concurrently raises median profitability. Thus, as median profitability falls within
continuing firms over time, the exit of less profitable firms offsets this decline for much of the
post-1980 period, suggesting that between-firm competition, by driving out less profitable firms,
has stabilized the median profit rate in the U.S. economy.
More specifically, within-firm changes push down median profitability by an average of 0.14
percentage points per year after 1980. As such, if we could ignore changes in the composition of
firms, median profitability would have fallen after 1980. Likewise, the contribution of new entry
after 1980 is also negative (averaging -0.14 percentage points per year), indicating that the median
profit rate among entering firms is on average lower than that of continuing firms, such that entering
firms further push down median profitability.
In contrast, firms that exit for cause make large, positive contributions to median profitability,
averaging 0.22 percentage points per year after 1980. This positive contribution highlights that
firms exiting for cause drive up median profitability when they exit, such that their profitability
is low relative to the reference group of continuing firms. Exit for cause, furthermore, dominates
the total impact of exiting firms on the median profit rate, whereas the contributions made by exit
due to mergers and voluntary delists are negligible. While the positive effect of exit for cause fails
to offset the negative effects of continuing and entering firms during the 1980s, such that median
profitability does decline during this decade (as shown in Section 3), exit for cause is key in the
following two decades for stabilizing median profitability.
What explains exiting and entering firms’ impacts on the evolution of median profitability?
Recall from Section 4 that the contributions of exiting and entering firms reflect both their weights
in the sample and their partial impacts on the median, evaluated relative to continuing firms. Thus,
an increase in the (positive) impact of exit for cause on median profitability, for example, can either
reflect a decline in median profitability among firms exiting for cause relative to continuing firms,
or that a larger share of firms exits for cause (or both). To provide intuition for the decomposition
results we, therefore, compare average total profit rates at the median and the 90th percentile
among entering, continuing, and exiting firms by decade in Table 2, and summarize average rates
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of entry into and exit out of the nonfinancial corporate sector in Table 3.24




1971-1979 9.43 9.06 2.67 10.00
1980-1989 6.11 8.11 -13.94 8.87
1990-1999 5.72 8.02 -12.72 7.84
2000-2009 4.31 7.58 -10.96 7.00




1971-1979 18.36 15.80 12.45 17.64
1980-1989 16.72 16.06 8.38 16.06
1990-1999 16.71 16.96 7.15 17.09
2000-2009 16.57 16.56 6.46 15.31
2010-2017 14.84 16.28 10.56 15.78
Notes: This table shows the average annual level of the median and the 90th percentile
of total profitability across entering, exiting and continuing firms. Total profitability
is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest
payments, relative to total assets. Excludes voluntary delists. See Section 2 for
details describing the data and sample.
In the case of exit for cause, both low and falling profitability relative to continuing firms and a
relatively high propensity to exit for cause during the 1990s produce its sizable positive contribution
to median profitability. The profitability comparisons in Table 2 highlight that median profitability
among firms exiting for cause is not only consistently lower than among continuing firms, but is
also negative since 1980. Given the large difference in total profitability between the median
continuing firm and the median firm that exits for cause (averaging 20 percentage points between
1990 and 2009), it is is unsurprising that exit for cause makes large, positive contributions to median
profitability. In turn, Table 3 shows that relatively high rates of exit for cause during the 1980s
and 1990s reinforce this effect. While an average of 3.5% of firms exit for cause each year during
the 1980s and 1990s, the average propensity to exit for cause declines to 2.4% per year since 2000.
Since 2000, for cause exits have also become a smaller share of total exits, falling from 44.6% of
24Because voluntary exits make up a small share of exiting firms and contribute little to the evolution of profitability,
we omit them from Table 2. We, also, include figures showing annual comparisons of continuing firms’ profitability
relative to that of entering and exiting firms at the 50th and 90th percentiles in the appendix (Figure A2).
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exits during the 1980s and 1990s to 34.5% since 2000.25
Table 3: Entry and exit rates
Types of exit
Entry rate Exit rate Cause rate Merger rate Voluntary rate
1971-1979 10.6% 3.9% 1.1% 2.8% 0.0%
1980-1989 8.7% 8.0% 3.4% 4.4% 0.1%
1990-1999 8.9% 8.6% 4.0% 4.5% 0.2%
2000-2009 3.7% 7.7% 3.1% 4.2% 0.4%
2010-2017 5.1% 5.9% 1.5% 4.4% 0.1%
Notes: The table shows entry and exit rates, calculated as the number of entering
(exiting) firms in a year, divided by the total number of firms in the previous year.
See Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.
In contrast, the first two columns of Table 2 highlight that new entry’s negative contribution
to median profitability reflects that the median entering firm tends to be less profitable than
the median continuing firm after 1980. Median profitability among entering firms averages 4.6%
between 1980 and 2017, as compared to 7.87% among continuing firms. In contrast, Table 3 captures
that, while new entry rates during the 1980s and 1990s are high (averaging 8.8% per year), entry
falls by more than half since 2000, to an average of 4.3% per year. Thus, the negative impact
of entry on median profitability increases between 2000 and 2017 despite declining entry, because
entering firms’ profitability falls relative to continuing firms (with the average gap between them
rising from 2.15 percentage points during the 1980s and 1990s to 4.65 percentage points since 2000).
Finally, Table 2 also shows that, in stark contrast to firms that exit for cause, the profitability of
the median firm exiting in a merger is comparable to that of continuing firms, especially since 1980.
As such, the contribution of mergers to changes in median profitability is modest (averaging only
-0.01 percentage points per year since 1980). This difference in the profitability of firms exiting for
cause versus in a merger reiterates the importance of distinguishing between reasons for exit.
Finally, the last years of our analysis, from 2010 to 2017, exhibit two differences with the
patterns characterizing most of the post-1980 period. First, continuing firms’ contribution becomes
neutral, averaging only 0.01 percentage points since 2010. Second, while exit for cause continues
driving up median profitability, the magnitude of this effect falls 0.21 percentage points between
25Doidge et al. (2017), whose analysis extends through 2012, find a substantive increase in exit rates after a 1997
peak in the number of listed firms that is driven by merger activity. Our calculations differ from theirs only in time
frame: While we obtain the same pattern when excluding 2013-2017, exit rates decline between 2012 and 2017.
22
2000-2009 and 2010-2017. This decline primarily reflects a falling rate of exit for cause: As shown
in Table 3, firms’ propensity to exit for cause falls to less than half its 2000-2009 average since 2010
(from 3.5% to 1.5%), during which time the profitability differential between continuing firms and
those exiting for cause is stable. These two changes offset one another, such that median profit
rate remains stable, averaging 7.2% from 2000-2009 and 7.5% from 2010-2017. These changes in
the contributions of churning and within-firm changes raise the question of if these years mark a
circumstantial or lasting change in how median profitability is regulated.
5.2 Profitability at the 90th percentile
Exit for cause, also, explains stability at the top of the total profitability distribution. Table 4,
which turns to the 90th percentile, reiterates the patterns at the median, wherein falling profitability
within continuing firms is offset by positive contributions of firms exiting for cause between 1980
and 2009. Between these years, continuing firms reduce profitability at the 90th percentile by an
average of 0.2 percentage points per year, while firms exiting for cause increase it by an annual
average of 0.12 percentage points. The bottom panel of Table 2 also shows that, like at the median,
the most profitable firms exiting for cause are not only less profitable than the most profitable
continuing firms, but that the profitability gap between them also rises over time. Specifically,
continuing firms are an average of 7.7 percentage points more profitable than exiting firms during
the 1980s and 1990s, and this differential rises to 10.1 percentage points in the first decade of the
2000s. Accordingly, the contribution of exit for cause to the 90th percentile of the profitability
distribution rises from 0.08 to 0.15 between these periods. In turn, the contributions of both
continuing firms and those exiting for cause is nearly neutral after 2009.
The main difference in the decomposition results of the median and the 90th percentile lies in
entering firms’ neutral contribution to profitability at the 90th percentile, which averages only 0.01
percentage points per year since 1980. The almost-zero contribution of entering firms reflects that –
unlike at the median, where entering firms are less profitable than continuing firms – entering firms
at the top of the distribution are approximately as profitable as their continuing counterparts, as
shown in the bottom panel of Table 2. Finally, like at the median, Table 4 shows that firms exiting
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Table 4: Decomposing average annual changes in median total profitability
90th percentile
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.41 0.19 0.21 0.22 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.00 0.01
1980-1989 -0.08 -0.24 0.15 0.07 0.08 0.08 -0.00 0.00 0.00
1990-1999 -0.02 -0.17 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.12 -0.02 0.00 0.02
2000-2009 -0.01 -0.19 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.01 -0.01
2010-2017 0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.01
Notes: The first column measures the average annual change in the 90th percentile of total profitability. Total
profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments, relative to
total assets. The reference group for the counterfactual sample is outgoing firms. See Section 2 for details describing
the data and sample.
through mergers and voluntary delists make negligible contributions to the evolution of profitability
at the 90th percentile.
As with the median, the years since 2010 again exhibit different patterns than the rest of the
post-1980 period. First, the contribution of exit for cause falls to 0.03 percentage points since 2010,
due both to rising profitability at the 90th percentile among firms exiting for cause (from 6.36% to
10.56%), and declining rates of exit for cause. Also like the median, continuing firms’ contribution
after 2010 becomes effectively neutral (0.03 percentage points), and declining profitability at the
90th percentile among entering firms (from 16.57% to 14.84%) reduces their previously neutral
contribution to -0.06 percentage points. As a result of these three trends, the 90th percentile of
the total profitability distribution is stable in this period. Again, it remains to be seen if this new
pattern marks a lasting change from that of the three decades before 2010.
5.3 Operational profitability
Similar decompositions of operational profitability further reconcile the differences in the total
and operational profitability distributions described in Section 3.26 These decompositions, first,
confirm the two main patterns underlying the evolution of total profitability: for most of the post-
1980 period, falling profitability within continuing firms reduces both the median and the 90th
percentile of operational profitability, while for cause exits by less profitable firms offset this trend.
The key difference with respect to the decompositions above lies in new entry, which is responsi-
26We show the decomposition results and the quantiles of operational profitability in appendix Tables A4 and A5.
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ble for the rapid increase in the 90th percentile of operational profitability that has generated rising
dispersion. This effect is especially important during the 1990s, during which time profitability at
the 90th percentile rises most quickly and entry rates are high, and subsequently declines as entry
rates fall. The key role of new entry in increasing dispersion in operational profitability ties closely
to the fact that the most profitable firms have come to constitute different groups when ranked by
total versus operational profits, as discussed in Section 3. In fact, the overlap between the most
profitable entering firms by total versus operational profitability, similarly, declines after 1980 –
and more dramatically than in the full sample.27 Entering firms at the 90th percentile of the opera-
tional profitability distribution, also, hold larger shares of financial and intangible assets during the
1990s than both continuing and exiting firms.28 Thus, while many entering firms do not have high
total profit rates relative to the most profitable continuing firms, they appear significantly more
profitable when income flows are evaluated relative to tangible capital, rather than total assets.
6 Conclusions
The results above establish new firm-level empirical evidence that churning among the group of
firms comprising the nonfinancial corporate sector stabilizes relative profitability at the median
and the top of the profitability distribution in the post-1980 U.S. economy. Most importantly, the
decomposition results highlight the importance of exit for cause — and, accordingly, the process
through which between-firm competition pushes out unprofitable firms — for stabilizing the profit
rate distribution. Thus, even in the absence of profit rate equalization, competitive forces create
stability in the distribution of profits over time.
We also show that, when profits are limited to operational profits on tangible capital, there
appears to be a dramatic increase in dispersion driven largely by growth in top firms’ profitability.
This rise in top-end operational profitability is closely tied to both the financialization of nonfi-
nancial corporations after 1970, and to post-1990 growth in intangible asset holdings. Notably,
27In the 1990s, for example, 55% of firms in the top 20% of the total profitability distribution are also in the top
20% of the operational profitability distribution, but this share is only 44.6% among entering firms. After 2010, these
match percentages decline to 37.8% and 29.6%.
28During the 1990s, the median share of financial and intangible assets in total assets among the top 20% of firms
by operational profitability is 75.1%, but 82.5% for entering firms in this group.
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however, the same firms that record rapidly rising profitability when profits are restricted to opera-
tional earnings on tangible capital underperform relative to the rest of the sector when considering
returns on their total asset holdings. As such, these firms are also decreasingly likely to also be
ranked as top firms by their total profit rates. Intangible and financial capital have, therefore,
moderated an increase in dispersion that appears when only considering tangible capital.
The results in this paper also suggest directions for future research. First, the analysis highlights
a role for further firm-level analyses of profitability. In particular, firm-level data allows analysis
of distributional statistics beyond the mean, making it particularly well-suited to analyzing com-
petitive dynamics. The capacity to distinguish tangible, financial, and intangible capital is, also,
increasingly important in recent decades. Second, the results raise a series of further questions
regarding firm characteristics and the evolution of corporate profitability. We show that differences
in portfolio composition help explain a growing divergence between total and operational measures
of the profit rate. However, a series of additional characteristics — including firm size, financial
asset composition, and industry — lay outside the scope of this analysis.
Finally, the divergence we document between total and operational profitability raises questions
about the roles of financial and intangible capital on firms’ balance sheets. For example, insofar
as financial assets reflect cash, growth in financial capital may suggest constrained opportunities
for profitable fixed investment. The fact that firms with top operational profit rates also hold
particularly large stocks of intangible assets, furthermore, raises the possibility that that these firms’
growth strategies increasingly center on acquisitions of existing firms. Our results suggest that the
intangible capital generated by acquisitions tends to yield low returns relative to tangible capital
generated through internal accumulation, limiting dispersion. While our decompositions show that
firms acquired in mergers do not differ in profitability from incumbent firms, the pricing of their
intangible assets may subsequently depress the total profitability of acquiring firms. Thus, mergers
and acquisitions, may be another important mechanism through which inter-firm competition has
stabilized the profit rate distribution.
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Davis, L. & Orhangazi, Ö. (2021). Competition and monopoly in the U.S. economy: What do the
industrial concentration data show? Competition & Change, 25 (1), 3–30.
De Loecker, J., Eeckhout, J., & Unger, G. (2020). The rise of market power and the macroeconomic
implications. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135 (2), 561–644.
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M., & Lemieux, T. (1996). Labor market institutions and the distribution
of wages, 1973-1992: A semiparametric approach. Econometrica, 64 (5), 1001–1044.
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G. A., & Stulz, R. M. (2017). The U.S. listing gap. Journal of Financial
Economics, 123 (3), 464–487.
Dumenil, G. & Levy, D. (2002). The profit rate: Where and how much did it fall? Did it recover?
(USA 1948-2000). Review of Radical Political Economics, 34 (4), 437–461.
Fairfield, P. M., Ramnath, S., & Yohn, T. L. (2009). Do industry-level analyses improve forecasts
of financial performance? Journal of Accounting Research, 47 (1), 147–178.
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (2000). Forecasting profitability and earnings. The Journal of
Business, 73 (2), 161–175.
Fama, E. F. & French, K. R. (2004). New lists: Fundamentals and survival rates. Journal of
Financial Economics, 73 (2), 229–269.
Firpo, S., Fortin, N. M., & Lemieux, T. (2009). Unconditional quantile regressions. Econometrica,
77 (3), 953–973.
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., & Firpo, S. (2011). Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 4, chapter 1,
(pp. 1–102). Elsevier.
Goddard, J., Tavakoli, M., & Wilson, J. O. (2005). Determinants of profitability in European man-
ufacturing and services: Evidence from a dynamic panel model. Applied Financial Economics,
15 (18), 1269–1282.
28
Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P.-H., & Li, D. (2018). Innovative originality, profitability, and stock returns.
The Review of Financial Studies, 31 (7), 2553–2605.
Kahle, K. M. & Stulz, R. M. (2017). Is the U.S. public corporation in trouble? Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 31 (3), 67–88.
Lev, B. (2000). Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting. Brookings Institution
Press.
Martinez, I. & Serve, S. (2017). Reasons for delisting and consequences: A literature review and
research agenda. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31 (3), 733–770.
Marx, K. (1990/1867). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I. New York, NY:
Penguin Classics.
Marx, K. (1991/1894). Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume III. New York, NY:
Penguin Classics.
Maury, B. (2018). Sustainable competitive advantage and profitability persistence: Sources versus
outcomes for assessing advantage. Journal of Business Research, 84, 100–113.
Michl, T. R. (1988). The two-stage decline in U.S. nonfinancial corporate profitability, 1948-1986.
Review of Radical Political Economics, 20 (4), 1–22.
Moseley, F. (2019). Capital in general and competition. In M. Vidal, T. Smith, T. Rotta, & P. Prew
(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx (pp. 261–278). Oxford University Press.
Nissim, D. & Penman, S. H. (2001). Ratio analysis and equity valuation: From research to practice.
Review of Accounting Studies, 6 (1), 109–154.
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A Additional tables and figures
Table A1: Decomposition of changes in the 90-50 ratio
(Averages of year-to-year decompositions)
Total Profitability
∆ 90-50 ratio Decomposition (in p.p.)
(avg/year, %) 90th Percentile Median Interaction
1971-1979 0.12 2.51 -2.25 -0.13
1980-1989 2.44 -0.29 2.94 -0.21
1990-1999 0.46 -0.09 0.61 -0.06
2000-2009 -0.51 -0.17 -0.07 -0.27
2010-2017 0.60 0.00 0.93 -0.33
Operational Profitability
∆ 90-50 ratio Decomposition (in p.p.)
(avg/year, %) 90th Percentile Median Interaction
1971-1979 0.67 2.83 -1.90 -0.26
1980-1989 5.00 2.44 2.82 -0.25
1990-1999 3.25 5.21 -1.72 -0.24
2000-2009 1.74 4.70 -2.21 -0.74
2010-2017 -1.30 -1.71 0.56 -0.14
Notes: The table shows annual decompositions averaged over 10-year intervals of the change
in the 90-50 ratio between two years into the rate of change in the 90th percentile, the rate
of change in the inverse of the median, and the cross-product of the first two terms.Algebraic
manipulation yields the following decomposition: r̂t = p̂90,t + p̂
−1
50,t + p̂90,t × p̂
−1
50,t. Total
profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest
payments, relative to total assets. Operational profitability is operating income before de-
preciation minus taxes and interest payments, relative to fixed capital and inventories. Both
profit rates are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile, and are expressed in percentages.
See Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.
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Figure A1: Cumulative distribution functions
(a) Total profitability (b) Operational profitability
Notes: Total profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments,
relative to total assets. Operational profitability is operating income minus taxes and interest payments, relative to
fixed capital and inventories. Both profit rates are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile. See Section 2 for details
describing the data and sample.
Table A2: Mean shares of Financial and Intangible Assets in Total Assets
Financial and Intangible Assets Financial Assets Intangible Assets
Top 20% Top 20% Top 20% Top 20% Top 20% Top 20%
by Operational by Total by Operational by Total by Operational by Total
Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability Profitability
1971-1979 51.8 40.4 47.2 37.9 4.7 2.5
1980-1989 58.8 45.9 54.7 43.5 4.1 2.4
1990-1999 72.8 53.7 62.2 48.2 10.6 5.5
2000-2009 81.5 57.0 56.3 44.1 25.2 12.8
2010-2017 85.1 59.6 50.5 41.4 34.6 18.1
Notes: The table shows the % shares of financial and intangible assets, by decade, for firms in the top 20% of
profits when ranked by operational profitability and when ranked by total profitability. Total profitability is the
sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments, relative to total assets.
Operational profitability is operating income minus taxes and interest payments, relative to fixed capital and
inventories. Financial assets are the sum of cash and short-term investments (che), investments and advances
(ivaeq and ivao), receivables (rect), current assets (aco) and other assets (ao). See Section 2 for details describing
the data and sample.
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Table A3: Decompositions of total profitability with incoming firms as reference
Median
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.00
1980-1989 -0.26 -0.24 -0.02 -0.16 0.14 0.19 -0.05 0.01 -0.01
1990-1999 -0.07 -0.17 0.10 -0.15 0.26 0.28 -0.00 0.00 -0.03
2000-2009 0.02 -0.17 0.19 -0.11 0.30 0.30 0.01 0.02 -0.03
2010-2017 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.18 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 -0.02
90th percentile
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.41 0.17 0.24 0.26 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.00
1980-1989 -0.08 -0.22 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01
1990-1999 -0.02 -0.15 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.01 0.00 0.01
2000-2009 -0.01 -0.21 0.20 -0.01 0.21 0.15 0.04 0.01 0.00
2010-2017 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
Notes: The first column measures the average annual change in the median and 90th percentiles of total profitability.
Total profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating income, less income taxes and interest payments,
relative to total assets. The reference group for the counterfactual sample is incoming firms. See Section 2 for
details describing the data and sample.
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Figure A2: Comparison of total profitability between continuing, entering and exiting firms
At the median and 90th percentile
(a) Median
Continuing and entering firms
(b) Median
Continuing and exiting firms
(c) 90th percentile
Continuing and entering firms
(d) 90th percentile
Continuing and exiting firms
Notes: These figures compares the annual level of the median and 90th percentile of total profitability among
continuing firms to that of entering and exiting firms. Total profitability is the sum of operating and nonoperating
income, less income taxes and interest payments, relative to total assets. For comparability with Table 2, we exclude
voluntary delists. See Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.
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Table A4: Decompositions of operational profitability with outgoing firms as reference
Median
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.31 0.23 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.00
1980-1989 -0.33 -0.42 0.09 -0.16 0.25 0.40 -0.13 0.01 -0.03
1990-1999 0.25 -0.24 0.49 -0.10 0.60 0.71 -0.10 0.01 -0.03
2000-2009 0.40 -0.18 0.58 -0.19 0.77 0.90 -0.05 0.07 -0.15
2010-2017 -0.01 0.12 -0.13 -0.34 0.20 0.38 -0.15 0.02 -0.04
90th percentile
Annual Within Composition Entering Firms Exiting Firms
Change Total Total For Cause Mergers Voluntary Resid.
1971-1979 0.78 0.06 0.73 0.73 -0.00 0.06 -0.07 -0.00 0.01
1980-1989 0.81 -0.52 1.32 0.96 0.37 0.36 -0.03 0.01 0.03
1990-1999 2.68 -0.66 3.34 2.82 0.52 1.14 -0.58 0.01 -0.05
2000-2009 3.14 1.64 1.50 0.36 1.14 1.51 -0.45 0.15 -0.07
2010-2017 -1.66 0.05 -1.70 -0.11 -1.60 0.70 -1.97 0.05 -0.37
Notes: The first column measures the average annual change in the median and 90th percentiles of operational
profitability. Operational profitability is operating income before depreciation minus taxes and interest payments,
relative to fixed capital and inventories. The reference group for the counterfactual sample is outgoing firms. See
Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.




1971-1979 14.41 13.33 2.22 14.88
1980-1989 8.66 11.37 -35.86 12.98
1990-1999 7.77 14.12 -35.02 15.60
2000-2009 6.20 16.91 -50.29 16.80




1971-1979 37.53 27.94 19.89 33.09
1980-1989 49.44 31.31 12.17 32.54
1990-1999 82.52 51.39 12.65 69.23
2000-2009 89.11 75.30 17.29 89.74
2010-2017 83.34 87.96 31.24 105.81
Notes: This table shows the average annual level of the median and the 90th per-
centile of operational profitability across entering, exiting and continuing firms. Oper-
ational profitability is operating income before depreciation minus taxes and interest
payments, relative to fixed capital and inventories. Excludes voluntary delists. See
Section 2 for details describing the data and sample.
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